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Effects of Beverage Alcohol Price and Tax Levels on Drinking: A Systematic Review and 
Meta-analysis of 1003 Estimates from 112 Studies 
 
Alexander C.  Wagenaar, PhD, Matthew J. Salois, MA & Kelli A. Komro, MPH, PhD 
Abstract 
 
Aims. We conducted a systematic review of studies examining relationships between measures 
of beverage alcohol tax or price levels and alcohol sales or self-reported drinking. A total of 112 
studies of alcohol tax or price effects were found, containing1003 estimates of the 
tax/priceconsumption relationship.  
Design.  Studies included analyses of alternative outcome measures, varying subgroups of the 
population, several statistical models, and use different units of analysis. Multiple estimates were 
coded from each study, along with numerous study characteristics. Using reported estimates, 
standard errors, t-ratios, sample sizes and other statistics, we calculated the partial correlation for 
the relationship between alcohol price or tax and sales or drinking measures for each major 
model or subgroup reported within each study. Random-effects models were used to combine 
studies for inverse variance weighted overall estimates of the magnitude and significance of the 
relationship between alcohol tax/price and drinking. 
Findings. Simple means of reported elasticities are -0.46 for beer, -0.69 for wine, -0.80 for 
spirits. Meta-analytic results document the highly significant relationships (p<.001) between 
alcohol tax or price measures and indices of sales or consumption of alcohol (aggregate-level r = 
-0.17 for beer, -0.30 for wine, -0.29 for spirits, and -0.44 for total alcohol). Price/tax also 
significantly affects heavy drinking (mean reported elasticity = -0.28, individual-level r = -0.01, 
p<.01), but the magnitude of effect is smaller than effects on overall drinking. 
 Summary 
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Conclusions. A large literature establishes that beverage alcohol prices and taxes are inversely 
related to drinking. Effects are large compared to other prevention policies and programs. Public 
policies that raise prices of alcohol are an effective means to reduce drinking.  
 
Keywords: alcohol, price, tax, systematic review, meta-analysis
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INTRODUCTION 
There is a large literature over the past several decades on the relationship between beverage 
alcohol tax and price levels and alcohol sales or consumption measures. Excise and sales taxes 
represent the most widespread public policy affecting retail price of alcohol; some studies 
measure prices directly, and many use tax rates as a surrogate measure for price, since 
differences in price across geographic areas are largely due to differing tax rates. Studies differ 
substantially in terms of methodological quality—some using longitudinal designs and others are 
simple cross-sectional surveys, some carefully controlled with comparison groups and 
covariates, others more rudimentary analyses. Economists, using contemporary econometric 
modeling methods, conduct a majority of these studies, but a substantial minority of studies are 
conducted by scientists in other disciplines related to health or social sciences. Beyond obvious 
differences in methodological quality from study to study, even studies most would consider of 
high quality vary in many details of measurement, jurisdiction studied, and statistical approach, 
and study authors’ interpretation of a given pattern of empirical findings varies substantially 
across papers. 
Several narrative reviews of this extensive literature have appeared. Early reviews were 
conducted by Ornstein [1] and Ornstein & Levy [2]. They suggest best estimates of price 
elasticities for beer, wine and spirits to be -0.30, -1.00 and -1.50, respectively. Leung and Phelps 
[3] report that studies using individual-level data tend to obtain larger (i.e., more elastic) demand 
estimates than aggregate-level studies. Also, they report that results from aggregate-level studies 
are sensitive to the choice of functional form in the demand model specification. Manning, et al. 
[4] examine several aggregate-level studies on the effects of excise taxes on alcohol 
consumption, reporting a range of price elasticities between -0.80 and -2.0 for spirits; -0.64 and -
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1.0 for wine; -0.25 and +0.24 for beer; and -0.50 and -1.6 for overall alcohol consumption. 
Grossman, et al. [5] reviewed research on price effects of alcohol on consumption by youth, 
comparing different individual and aggregate data sets between 1974 and 1989. They conclude 
that both frequent and heavy consumption of alcohol by youth are negatively correlated with 
alcohol price. Edwards et al. [6] tabulated 52 sets of elasticity estimates for beer, wine, and 
distilled spirits for 18 countries across different time periods. The elasticities vary substantially 
across studies, countries, time, beverage type, and whether the elasticity estimate is elastic, unit 
elastic, or inelastic. But note that, all, with the exception of one estimate, are negative. Cook and 
Moore [7] summarized the economic literature on drinking and associated outcomes, concluding 
that the demand for alcohol is downward sloping, indicating excise taxes can be used as an 
effective alcohol-control policy. Chaloupka, et al. [8] reviewed studies that examine price effects 
on consumption and alcohol-related outcomes for youth. They conclude that frequency of youth 
drinking and probability of heavy drinking can be decreased by an increase in beer excise taxes.
 Only two meta-analyses have been published, both of which have different goals and use 
a fundamentally different approach than our study reported here. Fogarty [9] took alcohol 
elasticity estimates from a review by Edwards, et al. [6] which only included studies through 
1992; Gallet [10] includes 132 studies of alcohol price, income or advertising elasticities through 
2003. The two studies [9, 10] report illuminating results on possible effects of study 
characteristics (i.e., data used, model specification, estimation method) on estimated elasticity. 
However, neither takes into account the variances attached to each estimate coming from the 
primary studies, implicitly weighting each estimate equally. In contrast, we explicitly cumulate 
the evidence by weighting each estimated effect by the inverse of its variance. Gallet [10] used 
dummy variables to account for study-author effects, while we used random effects models 
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which into account the second-level variance at the study level in assessing the precision of the 
cumulative estimates. In short, the Fogarty and Gallet studies come from an econometric 
tradition and report results from simple OLS regressions of study characteristics on reported 
elasticity. The present study comes out of the systematic review and meta-analysis traditions in 
epidemiology and the social sciences, where evidence for an underlying relationship of 
theoretical and practical significance is cumulated across studies based on the point estimates 
and estimated variances from individual studies using multi-level random effects models. 
 
METHODS 
The core independent variable is measured in this literature in two main ways: direct 
measurement of retail price of alcoholic beverages, or use of tax rates as an indicator or surrogate 
for prices, since cross-jurisdiction and longitudinal variability in prices is heavily influenced by 
state/province/country tax rates on alcohol. As Kenkel [11] notes, economic theory predicts taxes 
will be fully passed through to consumers, given a competitive environment with constant 
marginal costs of production, and such a one-to-one pass through is a ―standard assumption‖ in 
most of the research on alcohol taxes or prices. While empirical evidence is fairly limited, data 
indicate that taxes are passed through to prices, typically at pass-through rates of one to two (e.g., 
a 10 cent increase in tax produces a 10 to 20 cent increase in price; [11-13]). For the present 
meta-analysis, we included studies that use tax rates as a price indicator and those that measured 
retail prices directly, given the high correlation between the two. Nevertheless, the issue of 
potentially varying pass-through rates depending on local market and regulatory conditions must 
be noted in projecting tax policy effects. Finally, many jurisdictions control alcohol prices via 
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mechanisms other than taxes (e.g., distribution monopolies, licensing fees); effects of such non-
tax regulations (which in some cases affect prices) are not included in the current meta-analysis. 
The core dependent variables for the current study are: (1) measures of the quantity, 
prevalence, or frequency of alcohol sold or consumed, stratified by beverage type when available 
(beer, wine, spirits), and (2) measures of heavy consumption or intoxication. 
Data for this meta-analytic study are quantitative estimates of the magnitude or strength 
of these relationships, and estimates of the variability or error of those estimates, all coming from 
previously completed studies in the literature. Thus, major components of the project were 
identifying and obtaining the original study reports, calculating and coding multiple effect sizes 
and standard errors along with numerous population and other characteristics from each study, 
and statistically aggregating across all resulting estimates of the underlying relationships of 
conceptual interest. Each of these is now addressed in more detail. 
Data Collection--Literature Search 
A comprehensive literature search was conducted by a doctoral-level graduate student with 
expertise in econometric and statistical methods. Searches were conducted of nine databases to 
identify studies of interest: AgEcon Search (1960-present), Blackwell-Synergy (1879-present), 
EBSCO Host, which encompasses EconLit (1969-present), Academic Search Premier (1922-
present), Business Source Premier (1922-present), and PsychInfo (1967-present), JSTOR (1838-
present), MEDLINE (1950-present), Springer (1992-present), ScienceDirect (1823-present), ISI 
Web of Knowledge (1900-present), and Wiley (1961-present). The entire record for each 
document was included in each search; thus, any record with any search term in the title, 
keywords, subject headings, descriptors or abstract fields would be identified. The set of search 
terms that was used for each database is as follows, where * is the truncation indicator to include 
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all forms of the root word: [(tax OR taxes OR taxation OR cost OR cost* OR price OR prices) 
AND (alcohol* OR drinking OR liquor OR drunk* OR beer OR wine OR spirits OR malt 
beverage*)]. The search process, particularly for older papers not in current on-line databases, 
was supplemented with an extensive reprint file of alcohol tax papers maintained over the last 30 
years by the first author. Moreover, ―snowball‖ sampling, using reference lists from each 
identified paper, was used to locate additional studies. The original document for each 
publication was obtained and reviewed for relevance and content. Studies were excluded from 
analysis if they: (1) are duplicate publications of a single study/dataset (keeping most recent); (2) 
are empirical studies but do not provide sufficient data for calculating some form of numeric 
estimate of effect and estimate of its standard error; (3) are commentaries, legal reviews, 
literature reviews, or otherwise report no new data; or (4) are not written in English. The above 
procedures produced 112 papers containing 1003 separate empirical estimates of the relationship 
between alcohol taxes/prices and drinking (see the Appendix for the complete list of citations).  
Despite extensive procedures to locate relevant studies, there are always limitations to the 
search strategy. First, analyses were exclusively based on reports published in English. This was 
simply a practical consideration; however, it could potentially bias the results of the meta-
analyses [14-16]. Research has shown that the proportion of studies with statistically significant 
results is higher among reports published in English compared with those in other languages [16-
18]. Thus, exclusion of non-English studies could lend to inflated meta-estimates of effect, but 
note that one study found the inflation in effect size due to English-language restriction to be 
only 2% [19]. Second, publication bias (or, more generally, small-study bias) is always a threat 
to the validity of a meta-analysis [20-22]. Statistically significant findings are more likely to be 
published than those that are not significant [14, 20-22], with one estimate suggesting that the 
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odds of publication are 2 to 4 times greater when results are statistically significant [14]. Thus, it 
is possible that a substantial number of studies with non-significant effects remain unpublished. 
Excluding these unpublished studies may introduce an upward bias into obtained effect estimates 
[23]. On the other hand, Sutton et al. [24] empirically examined publication bias across meta-
analyses; while 54% of meta-analyses studied were determined to have had missing studies, 
these biases ―did not affect the conclusions‖ of the meta-analyses. We did not exclude available 
unpublished studies, but we also did not implement extensive searching for difficult-to-find 
unpublished studies. While clearly beneficial, inclusion of explicit search procedures for such 
―fugitive‖ literature is prohibitively expensive. Methodologically, this creates a risk the results 
are subject to publication bias.  
Coding—Determining Effect Sizes and their Precision 
Meta-analysis aggregates and compares findings from different research studies, therefore it is 
necessary that those findings are both conceptually comparable and configured in a similar 
statistical form [25]. The first criterion requires that included studies deal with the same 
constructs and relationships in order for meaningful comparisons to be made. This can be 
problematic, because what is deemed conceptually comparable may differ across analysts, a 
particular issue when scientists in different disciplines analyze the same set of studies. In the 
present case, all the studies were conceptually very similar, examining relationships of identical 
concepts. Nevertheless, there is considerable variability in specific measures, research designs, 
and statistical models. For study findings to be meaningfully compared (and statistically 
aggregated and analyzed), they must lend to calculation of a single uniform effect-size metric 
that is appropriate to the conceptual nature of the relationship in the research findings and the 
statistical forms reported in the literature. Numerous population and study characteristics were 
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coded, including multiple outcome measures (eg., beer, wine, spirits, if reported separately), age 
group, research design, level of analysis, sample design and size, and statistical methods.   
Most important and complex is the coding of an effect size in a standardized comparable 
metric across all studies that represents both the direction and magnitude of the difference or 
relationship for each study finding. The individual studies identified used diverse research 
designs and statistical methods. Nevertheless, almost all provide results from some sort of 
regression equation showing estimated coefficients and standard errors or other statistics that 
indicate, or provide a basis for estimating, the standard error (e.g., a t-ratio or confidence 
interval). Multiple estimates from each study were coded, including multiple subgroups, multiple 
follow-ups, and from multiple statistical models for each subgroup. The measure of effect, its 
standard error, the analysis sample size, and the effect’s significance level were coded for each 
separate estimate. For studies that report p-value cut-off values (0.05, for example) but not exact 
values, we (conservatively) assigned the value 0.05, even though the (unknown) true exact value 
was less than .05.  
Statistical Analyses 
Based on statistics reported in each study, and using conversion formulae from the meta-analysis 
literature programmed in Comprehensive Meta-analysis 2.0 software (CMA; [26]), we estimated 
a standardized effect size r for each separate estimate of the underlying relationship of interest, 
where ))2(( 22 Nttr  and its associated Fisher’s Z given by rrES eZ i 11log5. . In 
addition to standardized effect size estimates, the standard errors of those estimates were 
calculated as 31 nSE
iZ
and zr SErSE *)1(
2
.  Note that the r estimates are also 
interpretable as the standardized slope of the relationship between price/tax and consumption. 
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At a broad level, statistical analyses involved combining diverse individual estimates of 
effect into a single (or small number of) meta-estimates of effect in a common metric, and 
standard error of that effect. We examined heterogeneity of effects and conducted sensitivity and 
robustness analyses to evaluate consistency of estimates across study characteristics, and risks to 
the meta-estimates due to publication bias and potential non-representativeness of the sample 
studies. 
 Combining the individual effect sizes into a single meta-estimate of effect involved 
several steps. First, we identified sets of statistically independent (e.g., separate youth and adult 
samples, separate states, etc.) and non-independent (e.g., multiple estimation models using the 
same population or sample) estimates. Intra-study effect sizes based on the same study 
population or sample were averaged such that only one value contributed to the meta-analyses 
[25]. Inverse variance weighting methods were applied to each resulting (independent) effect 
size, where the weight applied is ii vw 1 , with
2
iESi
SE . Second, we evaluated the effect size 
distribution for outliers, to determine the need for trimming or Windsorizing (results for both the 
full analyses and trimmed models without outlier studies are shown in Tables 1-5). We computed 
the weighted mean effect size for each subgroup (based on study characteristics) by 
iii wESwES )( , where ESi are the values of the effect size statistic used (here r or Fisher’s 
Z), wi is the inverse variance weight for each effect size i, and i is equal to 1 to k, with k being 
the number of effect estimates. 
Homogeneity tests within and across subgroups based on study characteristics were based 
on the Q statistic, 2)( ESESwQ ii , where ESi is the individual effect size for i = 1 to k, ES  
is the weighted mean effect size over the k effect sizes, and wi is the individual weight for ESi. Q 
12 
is distributed as a chi-square with k – 1 degrees of freedom [27]. A statistically significant Q 
indicates a heterogeneous effect size distribution [28]. 
Given our initial review of this literature and the diversity found, we expected statistically 
significant (residual) study-level heterogeneity, which was confirmed by significant Q-statistics. 
Therefore, we used random- (as opposed to fixed-) effects models when estimating average 
effects and their precision. Random-effects models are more conservative, producing wider 
confidence bounds around the meta-estimates of effect.  Random effects modeling means that the 
variance for each effect size is a function of both underlying subject-level sampling error and 
random, between-studies variance component [25], such that 
2*
ii vv , where iv  is the initial 
subject-level sampling error and 2 is the random variance component, estimated by 
)/()1( 22 iii wwwkQ , where Q is the value of the homogeneity test, k is the 
number of effect sizes, and wi is the inverse variance weight for each effect size defined under 
the fixed-effects model. The inverse variance weight applied to each effect size thus becomes 
** 1 ii vw  and the mean effect size is recomputed. Next, we computed the standard error of the 
mean effect size, iES wSE 1 , where wi (or 
*
iw for random effects models) is the inverse 
variance weight associated with effect size i with i = 1 to k effect sizes included in the mean [27]. 
We constructed confidence intervals and tested the significance of each mean effect size, where a 
95% confidence interval is )()95(. ESSEZES and the significance of the mean effect size can be 
obtained with a Z-test as
ES
SEESz . 
There is a debate in the meta-methods literature on whether direct meta-analyses of the 
partial r estimate from each study is best, or meta-analyses of the Fisher’s Z transform of the r’s 
is preferred to avoid possible bias in calculation of the standard error of r. For completeness, we 
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conducted all analyses twice, once using r values as inputs, and again using Fisher’s Z’s. 
However, the bias is known to be smaller than rounding error when study n’s are over 40 [29]; 
consistent with expectations, we found very little difference in results between the two, and our 
presentation here is based on analyses of r’s instead of Fisher’s Z’s.  
RESULTS  
First, we present results from studies which examined effects of alcohol price or tax on general 
alcohol consumption, not stratified by beverage type. The simple mean of 91 elasticity estimates 
reported is -0.51.  Because the underlying population variance of aggregate-level studies is 
considerably smaller than that of individual-level studies, we examined effect sizes separately for 
the two types of study. The inverse weighted overall partial r for 24 studies that examined these 
relationships using aggregate-level data (most often at the state/province level) is -0.44, which is 
highly significant (Z = 7.55, p < .01; Table 1).  Examination of the top panel of Table 1 shows 
how strong this evidence is—all but one study found an inverse relationship, and 19 of the 24 
studies show a significant inverse effect. At the individual level, the effect size in terms of 
standard deviation units is considerably smaller, as one would expect given the larger variation 
across individuals than across states/provinces, but the evidence remains very strong, with an 
overall r = -0.06, Z = -4.27, p<.01 (second panel of Table 1). Removing one outlier [30] has little 
effect on the overall results. 
************ 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
************ 
 The simple mean beer price/tax elasticity across 105 reported estimates in the 47 
identified studies is -0.46. Variance weighted overall partial r estimate from 40 aggregate-level 
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studies is -0.17 (Z = -6.91; p<.01; Table 2). All but five studies report an inverse relationship, 
and 11 of the 40 studies report an effect that is not statistically significant at the study level 
(using p<.05 criterion). Only seven individual-level studies specifically of price/tax effects on 
beer consumption were found. All seven report an inverse relationship, but four of the seven are 
not significant at the individual study level. Despite this, the seven studies as a group clearly 
show a significant inverse effect, with an overall inverse variance weighted r = -0.12, Z = -2.37, 
p=.02.  
************ 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
************ 
Thirty-two studies examined the effects of tax or price on wine consumption (mostly 
overlapping with authors who also report effects for beer and spirits). The simple mean of 93 
elasticities reported is -0.69. All but five studies report an inverse relationship, with five of the 
32 not significant at the study level (using p<.05 criterion). Five of six individual-level studies 
similarly report an inverse relationship, although half are not significant at the study level. 
However, the meta-estimated effect across the seven studies is clearly significant (r = -0.30, Z = -
8.03, p<.01; Table 3). 
************ 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
************ 
 Forty-five aggregate-level studies of alcohol tax/price effects on spirits consumption have 
appeared, reporting 103 elasticity estimates with an overall simple mean of -0.80. Thirty-nine of 
the 45 studies report an inverse effect estimate, and 11 of the 45 studies report no statistically 
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significant relationship. Combining all the estimates produces an estimated partial r = -0.29 (Z = 
-9.23, p<.01).  Similar results are found for the six individual-level studies (r = -0.10, Z = -2.52, 
p<.01; Table 4). 
************ 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
************ 
 Finally, ten studies of the effects of alcohol prices or taxes on various indicators of heavy 
drinking have appeared, all studies are inherently at the individual level, since sales data do not 
differentiate by drinking status. The simple mean of the ten elasticities reported is -0.28. All but 
one study found an inverse effect, and eight of the ten studies found statistically significant 
effects at the study level. The meta-estimate of effect across the ten studies is r = -0.01 (Z = -
2.54, p<.01; Table 5).  
************ 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
************ 
 Results are summarized in Figure 1 for the aggregate-level studies, and Figure 2 for the 
individual-level studies. The differing magnitude of estimated effects between the two types of 
studies is a consequence of a statistical artifact. The r estimates reported here represent the 
amount of change in standard deviation units in alcohol sales/consumption associated with a one 
standard deviation change in price/tax. Aggregating the population into larger units (such as 
cities, states or countries) substantially lowers the variability of the measure, since individual 
differences are ―averaged out‖ (a longstanding known effect in sociology; see Blalock, Jr. [31], 
p. 106).  
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************ 
INSERT FIGURES 1 & 2 HERE 
************ 
DISCUSSION 
Results confirm previous reviews of this literature, but extend those results in important ways. 
The literature we analyzed contains 1003 separate estimates of the underlying conceptual 
relationship of interest. Narrative reviews inherently take short-cuts, often including only 
―major‖ studies, or only studies in the reviewer’s discipline, or only recent studies. Narrative 
reviews often summarize the conclusions of the study authors, not necessarily the empirical 
results reported in data tables. And reviews often give disproportionate attention to a small 
number of studies with divergent results. The meta-analyses reported here demonstrate the 
statistically overwhelming evidence of effects of alcohol prices on drinking. Price affects 
drinking of all types of beverages, and across the population of drinkers from light drinkers to 
heavy drinkers. We know of no other preventive intervention to reduce drinking that has the 
numbers of studies and consistency of effects seen in the literature on alcohol taxes and prices. 
A frequent criticism of meta-analyses is that they combine ―apples and oranges,‖ that is, 
combine results from studies that differ in important ways. Our sample of studies is conceptually 
very well-integrated, but diverse in terms of units analyzed, treatments (i.e., size of tax or price 
change evaluated), outcome measures, settings, time, and specific statistical models. On the last 
issue, a purist would argue that results from models with differing sets of covariates cannot be 
combined with the methods described here (and moreover, methods to address this issue have 
not yet been developed). Optimally, we would have available identical (bivariate) estimates of 
effect from all studies, but such estimates are not available in the published papers. We are not 
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alone with this problem. Diversity in model covariates is fairly common in published meta-
analyses, and does not prevent investigators from statistically aggregating the evidence, even 
though statistical theory that is the basis of meta-analyses was originally based on uniform 
bivariate estimates (and implicitly assume all studies used the same research design and 
statistical method). We used random-effects (rather than fixed-effects) models to combine 
studies, which help take into account such study-level variability, permitting a relaxation of the 
assumption that all studies are estimating the exact same underlying effect. Moreover, our use of 
random effects models is deemed a conservative approach, since estimated confidence intervals 
around point estimates are larger for random-effects models than fixed-effect models. 
Importantly, future studies are warranted that statistically model potential explanations of 
differences in estimated effect sizes across studies, and that examine price/tax effects on a range 
of relevant health and social outcomes. We are continuing such analyses, with meta-analyses of 
price/tax effects on morbidity and mortality outcomes currently in progress. 
The meta-analyses reported here and much of the economic literature on alcohol may 
give the impression that price elasticities are somehow inherent properties of the different 
beverages studied. But results across studies suggest that the magnitude of price effects varies 
across groups, situations, and times. At the most basic level, price interacts with income in 
affecting consumption. Perhaps the effects of price/tax are not linear, but are characterized by 
effect thresholds such that effects qualitatively differ in communities or societies with very high 
or very low levels of consumption. All estimates of tax and price effects also reflect particular 
meanings and uses of alcoholic beverages across diverse social and cultural environments, and 
tax and price policies likely interact with a whole web of individual, community and societal 
influences on drinking behavior. 
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 Finally, the effect sizes reported here are large. Cohen [32], one of the ―founding fathers‖ 
of meta-analyses, suggested d (standardized difference) effect sizes under 0.20 are small, 0.50 
are medium, and >0.80 are large; equivalent effects in terms of r mean a small effect is 0.10, 
medium is 0.24 and large is 0.37. Lipsey & Wilson [33] report from a study of over 300 meta-
analyses of diverse behavioral and educational interventions showed a median effect size 
equivalent to r = 0.24. At the aggregate level where tax policy as a preventive intervention 
operates, the estimated effect sizes reported here for wine, spirits and overall alcohol 
consumption are clearly above such reported median level of prevention effectiveness. Given (1) 
very low cost of adjusting alcohol tax policies to achieve substantial prevention benefits, (2) the 
global burden of disease and injury due to alcohol consumption [34, 35], and (3) high levels of 
fiscal and social costs of alcohol-related problems [36-38], the magnitudes of effect that are 
clearly established in the extant literature on alcohol price effects are noteworthy. 
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Table 1:  Effects of Price on Alcohol Consumption 
Study r 
lower 
CI 
upper 
CI Z p 
Bask, 2004 -0.72 -0.83 -0.53 -5.83 0.00 
Bishai, 2005 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -4.63 0.00 
Blake, 1997 -0.57 -0.75 -0.32 -3.96 0.00 
Bourgeois, 1979 -0.06 -0.18 0.07 -0.85 0.40 
Brinkley, 1999 0.03 -0.27 0.33 0.22 0.83 
Clements, 1983 -0.71 -0.87 -0.42 -3.94 0.00 
Clements, 1991 -0.84 -0.92 -0.70 -6.63 0.00 
Clements, 1997 -0.60 -0.81 -0.23 -2.97 0.00 
Duffy, 1987 -0.58 -0.81 -0.20 -2.84 0.00 
Holm, 1992 0.01 -0.39 0.40 0.05 0.96 
Leppanen, 2001 -0.64 -0.84 -0.30 -3.29 0.00 
Levy, 1983 -0.62 -0.78 -0.38 -4.45 0.00 
McGuinness, 1980 -0.39 -0.71 0.07 -1.69 0.09 
Nelson, 1995 0.03 -0.35 0.41 0.15 0.88 
Nelson, 1997 -0.41 -0.59 -0.19 -3.45 0.00 
Nelson, 2003 -0.14 -0.22 -0.05 -3.01 0.00 
Ruhm, 1995 -0.40 -0.46 -0.33 -10.69 0.00 
Rush, 1986 -0.96 -0.98 -0.92 -9.95 0.00 
Selvanathan, 1988 -0.61 -0.79 -0.33 -3.77 0.00 
Smart, 1998 -0.83 -0.93 -0.60 -4.72 0.00 
Treno, 1993 0.07 -0.26 0.38 0.40 0.69 
Wilkinson, 1987 -0.10 -0.23 0.03 -1.48 0.14 
Young, 2003 -0.12 -0.18 -0.05 -3.25 0.00 
Zhang, 1999 -0.57 -0.73 -0.36 -4.53 0.00 
AGGREGATE-LEVEL STUDIES -0.44 -0.54 -0.34 -7.55 0.00 
      
Cameron, 2001 -0.04 -0.06 -0.02 -3.74 0.00 
Chaloupka, 1996 -0.02 -0.05 0.01 -1.31 0.19 
Chaloupka, 1997 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -4.03 0.00 
Cook, 1993 -0.09 -0.16 -0.01 -2.35 0.02 
Cook, 1994 -0.04 -0.08 -0.01 -2.25 0.02 
Dee, 1999 -0.05 -0.09 -0.01 -2.29 0.02 
DiNardo, 2001 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.29 0.77 
Farrell, 2003 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -1.96 0.05 
French, 2006 -0.03 -0.09 0.03 -0.99 0.32 
Gao, 1995 -0.08 -0.11 -0.05 -5.53 0.00 
Gius, 2005 0.00 -0.03 0.03 -0.12 0.90 
Grossman, 1998 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -3.18 0.00 
Grossman, 1999 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -13.75 0.00 
Hamilton, 1997 0.00 -0.04 0.05 0.08 0.93 
Harris, 2006 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 -1.58 0.11 
Henderson, 2004 -0.11 -0.18 -0.05 -3.40 0.00 
Kenkel, 1996 -0.06 -0.07 -0.04 -6.38 0.00 
Laixuthai, 1993 -0.05 -0.06 -0.03 -5.42 0.00 
Lyon, 1995 -0.05 -0.11 0.01 -1.71 0.09 
Manning, 1995 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 -1.79 0.07 
Pacula, 1998 -0.02 -0.05 0.00 -1.95 0.05 
Sloan, 1995 0.09 0.08 0.10 17.73 0.00 
Sutton, 1995 -0.04 -0.06 -0.01 -3.06 0.00 
Wang, 1996 -0.09 -0.15 -0.03 -3.00 0.00 
Waters, 1995 -0.18 -0.20 -0.16 -16.73 0.00 
Williams, 2003 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -2.03 0.04 
Williams, 2004 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -1.67 0.09 
Williams, 2005 0.02 0.00 0.03 2.62 0.01 
Yen, 1994 -0.10 -0.13 -0.07 -6.64 0.00 
Zhao, 2004 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.17 0.87 
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL STUDIES -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -4.27 0.00 
      
Total w/o Rush, 1986 -0.06 -0.08 -0.04 -7.56 0.00 
      
Total -0.06 -0.08 -0.05 -7.86 0.00 
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Mean Elasticity:  -0.51  n=91      
 
Table 2  Effects of Price on Beer Consumption 
Study r lower CI upper CI Z p 
Adrian, 1987 -0.30 -0.58 0.04 -1.72 0.08 
Asplund, 2007 -0.23 -0.24 -0.22 -37.85 0.00 
Beard, 1997 -0.20 -0.32 -0.07 -3.02 0.00 
Bentzen, 1999 -0.02 -0.35 0.32 -0.11 0.91 
Blake, 1997 -0.17 -0.46 0.15 -1.03 0.30 
Bourgeois, 1979 -0.11 -0.23 0.02 -1.71 0.09 
Clements, 1983 -0.61 -0.82 -0.27 -3.18 0.00 
Clements, 1991 -0.36 -0.63 -0.01 -2.03 0.04 
Duffy, 1982 -0.04 -0.33 0.26 -0.24 0.81 
Duffy, 1983 0.17 -0.08 0.40 1.32 0.19 
Duffy, 1987 -0.54 -0.79 -0.14 -2.55 0.01 
Freeman, 2000 -0.04 -0.09 0.01 -1.68 0.09 
Godfrey, 1988 -0.16 -0.52 0.25 -0.76 0.45 
Hogarty, 1972 -0.21 -0.36 -0.05 -2.58 0.01 
Holm, 1992 0.11 -0.13 0.33 0.89 0.37 
Johnson, 1974 -0.23 -0.37 -0.08 -2.96 0.00 
Johnson, 1977 -0.26 -0.41 -0.10 -3.15 0.00 
Johnson, 1992 -0.12 -0.23 0.00 -1.94 0.05 
Jones, 1989 -0.29 -0.48 -0.07 -2.60 0.01 
Kubik, 2002 -0.09 -0.14 -0.04 -3.25 0.00 
Kuo, 2003 -0.33 -0.35 -0.32 -36.20 0.00 
Lee, 1992 -0.43 -0.68 -0.09 -2.46 0.01 
Mast, 1999 -0.07 -0.16 0.03 -1.36 0.17 
Nelson, 1990 -0.34 -0.57 -0.06 -2.39 0.02 
Nelson, 1995 0.40 0.03 0.68 2.09 0.04 
Nelson, 1997 -0.29 -0.50 -0.05 -2.37 0.02 
Nelson, 2003 -0.21 -0.29 -0.12 -4.69 0.00 
Norstrom, 2005 -0.39 -0.63 -0.09 -2.51 0.01 
Ornstein, 1985 -0.15 -0.28 -0.01 -2.14 0.03 
Saffer, 1989 -0.15 -0.28 -0.01 -2.06 0.04 
Salisu, 1997 -0.18 -0.34 0.00 -1.99 0.05 
Selvanathan, 1988 -0.34 -0.62 0.02 -1.85 0.06 
Selvanathan, 1991 -0.33 -0.63 0.07 -1.61 0.11 
Thom, 1984 0.55 0.31 0.72 4.09 0.00 
Trolldal, 2005 -0.04 -0.11 0.03 -1.14 0.26 
Uri, 1986 -0.30 -0.53 -0.02 -2.11 0.03 
Walsh, 1970 0.03 -0.49 0.53 0.11 0.92 
Walsh, 1982 -0.45 -0.74 -0.01 -1.99 0.05 
Wette, 1993 -0.39 -0.65 -0.04 -2.20 0.03 
Zhang, 1999 -0.33 -0.55 -0.06 -2.36 0.02 
AGGREGATE-LEVEL -0.17 -0.22 -0.12 -6.91 0.00 
      
Angulo, 2001 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 -1.96 0.05 
Coate, 1988 -0.04 -0.08 0.01 -1.51 0.13 
Gao, 1995 -0.03 -0.06 0.00 -2.12 0.03 
Grossman, 1987 -0.06 -0.13 0.01 -1.58 0.11 
Heien, 1989 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.78 0.44 
Rabow, 1982 -0.06 -0.18 0.06 -1.00 0.32 
Wang, 1996 -0.58 -0.62 -0.54 -22.60 0.00 
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL  -0.12 -0.22 -0.02 -2.37 0.02 
      
Total w/o Thom, 1984 -0.18 -0.23 -0.12 -6.37 0.00 
      
Total -0.17 -0.22 -0.11 -5.93 0.00 
      
Mean Elasticity:  -0.46 n=105      
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Table 3:  Effects of Price on Wine Consumption 
Study r lower CI upper CI Z p 
Adrian, 1987 -0.48 -0.70 -0.18 -2.95 0.00 
Asplund, 2007 -0.10 -0.11 -0.09 -15.91 0.00 
Bentzen, 1999 -0.38 -0.63 -0.06 -2.27 0.02 
Blake, 1997 0.01 -0.30 0.32 0.06 0.96 
Bourgeois, 1979 0.04 -0.08 0.17 0.69 0.49 
Clements, 1983 -0.47 -0.74 -0.07 -2.27 0.02 
Clements, 1991 -0.36 -0.63 -0.01 -2.03 0.04 
Duffy, 1982 -0.48 -0.67 -0.23 -3.49 0.00 
Duffy, 1983 -0.23 -0.45 0.02 -1.80 0.07 
Duffy, 1987 -0.67 -0.86 -0.34 -3.47 0.00 
Godfrey, 1988 -0.42 -0.70 -0.03 -2.12 0.03 
Holm, 1992 -0.30 -0.49 -0.07 -2.57 0.01 
Johnson, 1974 -0.37 -0.50 -0.23 -4.86 0.00 
Johnson, 1977 -0.46 -0.58 -0.32 -5.85 0.00 
Johnson, 1992 -0.31 -0.41 -0.20 -5.25 0.00 
Jones, 1989 -0.41 -0.58 -0.21 -3.82 0.00 
Labys, 1976 -0.51 -0.79 -0.06 -2.20 0.03 
Nelson, 1990 -0.45 -0.65 -0.19 -3.27 0.00 
Nelson, 1995 0.34 -0.04 0.64 1.76 0.08 
Nelson, 1997 -0.28 -0.49 -0.04 -2.25 0.02 
Nelson, 2003 -0.24 -0.32 -0.15 -5.30 0.00 
Norstrom, 2005 -0.27 -0.54 0.04 -1.71 0.09 
Saffer, 1989 0.08 -0.06 0.22 1.12 0.26 
Salisu, 1997 -0.20 -0.36 -0.02 -2.22 0.03 
Selvanathan, 1988 -0.70 -0.84 -0.45 -4.55 0.00 
Selvanathan, 1991 -0.41 -0.69 -0.02 -2.06 0.04 
Thom, 1984 -0.06 -0.35 0.23 -0.43 0.67 
Trolldal, 2005 0.00 -0.07 0.08 0.09 0.93 
Uri, 1986 -0.66 -0.79 -0.47 -5.47 0.00 
Walsh, 1982 -0.52 -0.78 -0.10 -2.39 0.02 
Wette, 1993 -0.49 -0.72 -0.17 -2.90 0.00 
Zhang, 1999 -0.35 -0.57 -0.08 -2.54 0.01 
AGGREGATE-Level -0.30 -0.36 -0.23 -8.03 0.00 
      
Angulo, 2001 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 -1.96 0.05 
Gao, 1995 -0.01 -0.04 0.02 -0.81 0.42 
Grossman, 1987 -0.03 -0.10 0.04 -0.86 0.39 
Heien, 1989 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -2.75 0.01 
Rabow, 1982 0.01 -0.10 0.13 0.23 0.82 
Wang, 1996 -0.64 -0.67 -0.61 -25.72 0.00 
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL -0.14 -0.26 -0.01 -2.08 0.04 
      
Total -0.25 -0.30 -0.19 -8.86 0.00 
      
Mean Elasticity:  -0.69   n=93     
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Table 4:  Effects of Price on Distilled Spirits Consumption 
Study r lower CI upper CI Z p 
Adrian, 1987 -0.23 -0.52 0.12 -1.30 0.19 
Asplund, 2007 -0.28 -0.29 -0.27 -45.49 0.00 
Baltagi, 1990 -0.30 -0.54 -0.01 -2.04 0.04 
Baltagi, 1995 -0.07 -0.13 0.00 -2.10 0.04 
Baltagi, 2002 -0.08 -0.13 -0.03 -3.01 0.00 
Beard, 1997 -0.29 -0.41 -0.17 -4.55 0.00 
Bentzen, 1999 -0.42 -0.66 -0.10 -2.54 0.01 
Blake, 1997 -0.18 -0.47 0.14 -1.12 0.26 
Bourgeois, 1979 0.17 0.04 0.29 2.57 0.01 
Clements, 1983 -0.71 -0.87 -0.42 -3.94 0.00 
Clements, 1991 -0.77 -0.88 -0.58 -5.54 0.00 
Cook, 1982 -0.19 -0.27 -0.10 -4.17 0.00 
Duffy, 1982 -0.59 -0.75 -0.37 -4.54 0.00 
Duffy, 1983 -0.43 -0.61 -0.20 -3.56 0.00 
Duffy, 1987 -0.54 -0.79 -0.15 -2.58 0.01 
Godfrey, 1988 -0.74 -0.88 -0.49 -4.49 0.00 
Goel, 1995 -0.12 -0.19 -0.05 -3.47 0.00 
Hoadley, 1984 -0.24 -0.48 0.02 -1.78 0.07 
Holm, 1992 -0.08 -0.30 0.15 -0.68 0.50 
Johnson, 1974 -0.48 -0.59 -0.35 -6.57 0.00 
Johnson, 1977 -0.59 -0.69 -0.47 -7.91 0.00 
Johnson, 1992 0.01 -0.11 0.12 0.10 0.92 
Jones, 1989 -0.52 -0.66 -0.33 -5.01 0.00 
McCornac, 1984 -0.18 -0.35 0.00 -1.99 0.05 
Musgrave, 1988 -0.97 -0.99 -0.90 -6.08 0.00 
Nelson, 1990 -0.34 -0.57 -0.07 -2.44 0.01 
Nelson, 1995 0.48 0.13 0.73 2.58 0.01 
Nelson, 1997 -0.48 -0.65 -0.27 -4.17 0.00 
Nelson, 2003 0.02 -0.07 0.10 0.33 0.74 
Norstrom, 2005 0.06 -0.26 0.36 0.34 0.74 
Ornstein, 1985 -0.33 -0.45 -0.21 -4.99 0.00 
Saffer, 1989 -0.31 -0.43 -0.18 -4.49 0.00 
Salisu, 1997 -0.40 -0.54 -0.24 -4.69 0.00 
Selvanathan, 1988 -0.51 -0.73 -0.19 -2.96 0.00 
Selvanathan, 1991 -0.42 -0.70 -0.04 -2.14 0.03 
Skog, 2006 -0.76 -0.90 -0.50 -4.28 0.00 
Smith, 1976 -0.50 -0.69 -0.25 -3.61 0.00 
Thom, 1984 0.31 0.02 0.55 2.11 0.04 
Trolldal, 2005 -0.07 -0.14 0.00 -2.06 0.04 
Uri, 1986 -0.29 -0.52 -0.01 -2.05 0.04 
Wales, 1968 -0.21 -0.48 0.10 -1.34 0.18 
Walsh, 1970 -0.29 -0.70 0.26 -1.03 0.30 
Walsh, 1982 -0.58 -0.81 -0.18 -2.71 0.01 
Wette, 1993 -0.04 -0.38 0.32 -0.20 0.84 
Zhang, 1999 -0.03 -0.30 0.25 -0.19 0.85 
AGGREGATE-LEVEL -0.29 -0.34 -0.23 -9.23 0.00 
      
Angulo, 2001 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 -1.96 0.05 
Gao, 1995 -0.02 -0.05 0.01 -1.19 0.23 
Grossman, 1987 -0.07 -0.14 0.00 -1.87 0.06 
Heien, 1989 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 -2.53 0.01 
Rabow, 1982 -0.03 -0.15 0.10 -0.43 0.67 
Wang, 1996 -0.40 -0.45 -0.35 -14.48 0.00 
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL -0.10 -0.17 -0.02 -2.52 0.01 
      
Total w/o Musgrave, 1988 -0.24 -0.29 -0.19 -8.82 0.00 
      
Total   -0.25 -0.30 -0.20 -9.15 0.00 
      
Mean Elasticity -0.80  n=103      
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Table 5:  Effects of Price on Heavy Alcohol Use (all individual-level studies) 
Study r 
lower 
CI upper CI Z p 
Chaloupka, 1996 -0.01 -0.04 0.02 -0.77 0.44 
Chaloupka, 1997 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 -2.14 0.03 
Cook, 1994 -0.05 -0.09 0.00 -2.12 0.03 
Keng, 2006 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 -2.70 0.01 
Kenkel, 1993 -0.06 -0.11 -0.02 -2.72 0.01 
Kenkel, 1996 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.65 0.51 
Laixuthai, 1993 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 -2.45 0.01 
Powell, 2002 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 -2.58 0.01 
Sloan, 1995 -0.03 -0.05 0.00 -2.32 0.02 
Stout, 2000 0.01 0.00 0.02 2.69 0.01 
      
Total -0.01 -0.03 0.00 -2.54 0.01 
      
Mean Elasticity:   -0.28  n=10     
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Figure 1. Effects of Price on Alcohol Consumption: Aggregate-level Studies 
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Figure 2. Effects of Price on Alcohol Consumption: Individual-level Studies 
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